Did the Framers Mean a "Literal" Commander-in-Chief?

When General George Washington kneeled and handed over his sword to Congress, a symbolic act acknowledging its sole power to declare war and to raise and support armies in accordance with the U.S. Constitution, he still had five other swords. During his second presidential term in 1794, he unsheathed one of his swords and personally led a military campaign with a militia force of 15,000 against 7,000 farmers who had rebelled against an excise tax. Contextually, and when considering President George Washington and others who soon followed, did the framers of the Constitution expect the president's emergency powers in time of war, or as a commander-in-chief, to be literal? In other words, were presidents expected to lead troops into battle when Congress (and only Congress) raised armies and then declared war?

Not only does Article II of the U.S. Constitution state "the President shall be Commander- in-Chief of the Army and Navy...when called into actual service of the United States," but on entering and executing the office he/she solemnly swears to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." Since it was the same oath used for the induction of military personnel, was it expected, then, of presidents to also defend their country and the Constitution by either leading troops against invasive forces or to be deployed overseas in combat zones? Still, a casual reading of the Federalist Papers points to the role of the president as a literal commander-in-chief called into actual military service in defending the nation.(1) Perhaps this was a major reason the creation of the Department of War was one of Congress' and President Washington's first tasks. An old comrade-in-arms, Henry Knox, became his Secretary of War.

Being a literal commander-in-chief was one reason President John Adams declared neutrality during a war between Great Britain and France. When Jay's Treaty improved America's relationship with Britain but provoked strong retaliation by France, and when cries for war filled the air, President Adams called for peace. He encouraged Congress to pass the Sedition Act, which made it a crime to speak and write "false, scandalous and malicious statements against the government," especially when trying to instigate war with France. Unlike President Adams who would rather unsheathe a pen-he defended the British soldiers charged in the Boston Massacre, secured loans for the Revolutionary War, and negotiated the Treaty of Paris-President James Madison found himself in a quandary after war hawks in Congress declared war on Britain, and when he expressed his desire to conquer Canada. When British forces marched on Washington, President Madison commanded a battery of canons and experienced serious combat at Bladensburg.

The "commander-in-chief" clause was never about a present-day mythical provision designed to ensure civilian control of the military. Instead, it was a literal clause in which the president himself in times of war and national emergencies should serve and be among those he/she has ordered into battle or deployed overseas. A literal commander-in-chief would not think of war lightly. This historically and contextually constitutional principle, as the framers understood it, would actually guard against a commander-of-disconnect too, specifically regarding the seriousness and horrors of war. It would also prevent presidents from appearing before comedy clubs, like the mainstream press corps, and joke about not finding weapons of mass destruction while looking under tables and while tens of thousands of people are being slaughtered. This concept would also forbid presidents to not go into hiding when America's symbols of militarism capitalism are being attacked.

Perhaps the next Amendment to the U.S. Constitution should not only be a national war referendum, but a clause stating that in times of war, the president should lead troops into battle. It should also include presidential deployments to overseas combat zones. Such an amendment would more than likely thwart needless wars and quickly end lengthy military occupations executed by imperial presidents that sit behind desks and remain aloof from their realities. It would also prevent presidential imposters and the trivialization of the oath of office. James Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 51 that, "The great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the governed and in the next place oblige it to control itself. This was, however, before the usurpation of both the government and the people by imperial corporations, belligerent presidents, and a professional standing army in the service of Empire, all of which the patriots fought against to be free.